Infrastructure & Security

Security Architecture

How Calamari protects your infrastructure, credentials, and trading operations. Written for enterprise prospects evaluating our security posture.

Dedicated VM

per customer

Zero trade data

stored on our servers

30s health checks

external watchdog

TLS everywhere

no plaintext channels

01

Infrastructure Overview

Every Calamari customer receives a dedicated Windows Server appliance — a Tentacle — provisioned on Contabo bare-metal-class dedicated virtual machines in European data centers. No two customers share an operating system, a trading terminal installation, or any application runtime. Isolation is architectural, not logical.

Each Tentacle runs Windows Server 2022 with a hardened baseline configuration. The Tentacle API service (FastAPI on port 8000) is the sole programmatic entry point to the appliance. All other inbound ports are blocked by default at the Windows Firewall layer.

Hosting Provider

Contabo GmbH (DE)

OS

Windows Server 2022

Isolation Model

Dedicated VM per customer

02

Network Security

The Calamari Controller — a hardened Linux orchestrator — communicates with each Tentacle exclusively over encrypted channels. All Tentacle API calls are authenticated with per-appliance API keys and transmitted over TLS. WinRM management traffic uses HTTPS (port 5986) with certificate-pinned connections; the plaintext WinRM port (5985) is blocked.

Windows Firewall rules on each Tentacle are configured to accept inbound connections only from the Controller's IP address on the permitted ports. All other inbound traffic is silently dropped. This means your Tentacle is not reachable from the public internet except through Calamari's authenticated management plane.

  • →Port 8000 (Tentacle API): inbound allowed from Controller IP only
  • →Port 5986 (WinRM HTTPS): inbound allowed from Controller IP only
  • →Port 443 (LiveView/noVNC): inbound allowed, TLS-terminated, session-authenticated
  • →Port 5985 (WinRM HTTP): blocked
  • →Port 5900 (VNC): blocked externally — loopback only
  • →All other inbound ports: blocked by default firewall policy
03

Data Protection

Calamari does not store your trade data on our servers. All trade execution happens locally on your Tentacle. Your MT4/MT5 terminals connect directly to your broker — Calamari's infrastructure sits between you and your terminal, not between your terminal and your broker.

Broker credentials (account numbers and passwords) are handled with a zero-trust model. Passwords are passed directly to the MT4/MT5 login function in memory and are never written to disk, never logged, and never transmitted to Calamari's servers. The credential vault stores account numbers and server names for reconnection purposes; passwords are not retained after the login operation completes.

NOT STOREDTrade execution data
NOT STOREDBroker passwords
STOREDMT4/MT5 account numbers
STOREDBroker server names
STOREDTentacle health telemetry
STOREDBilling information
04

Access Control

Each Tentacle is provisioned with a unique, randomly generated API key. This key is stored in Windows Credential Manager on the appliance — not in a configuration file — and is never transmitted in plaintext. Customers can rotate their API key at any time through the dashboard; the old key is invalidated immediately upon rotation.

Calamari staff do not have standing access to customer Tentacles. Temporary support access requires explicit customer authorization and is time-limited. Every access event — including the timestamp, purpose, and personnel involved — is logged in the immutable audit trail on the appliance.

Per-Tentacle Isolation

Each appliance has its own API key. A compromise of one Tentacle does not affect any other customer.

No Shared Resources

No shared databases, no shared runtimes, no shared network segments between customers.

Key Rotation

API keys can be rotated on demand. Old keys are invalidated server-side immediately.

Audit Logging

All API calls, support access events, and configuration changes are logged with timestamps.

05

Monitoring & Recovery

The Calamari Watchdog Controller monitors every active Tentacle from outside the Tentacle's failure domain. This is a critical design principle: if a Tentacle crashes, freezes, or loses network connectivity, the monitoring system detects the failure independently because it does not rely on an agent running inside the Tentacle itself.

Health checks run every 30 seconds. If a Tentacle fails to respond within the configured threshold, the Watchdog initiates an automated recovery sequence: it attempts a graceful service restart first, escalates to a full appliance restart if needed, and alerts the operations team for manual intervention if automated recovery does not succeed within the recovery window.

1

Health check every 30 seconds

GET /health on each Tentacle API

2

Failure detected

No response within threshold → alert triggered

3

Automated service restart

WinSW restarts the Tentacle API service

4

Appliance restart if needed

Full VM restart via Contabo API

5

Operations alert

Escalation to on-call if automated recovery fails

06

Compliance Posture

Calamari is an early-stage infrastructure company. We are not currently SOC 2 Type II certified. We are building toward that certification as part of our Phase 6 roadmap (Q1 2027). The controls described on this page represent our current implemented security practices, not a certified audit outcome.

Our privacy practices are designed to be consistent with GDPR and CCPA requirements. We do not sell customer data, we do not use trading data for any purpose other than service delivery, and we provide data deletion on request. See our Privacy Policy for the complete data handling disclosure.

SOC 2 Type II

Roadmap (Q1 2027)

GDPR Alignment

Implemented

CCPA Alignment

Implemented

Report a Vulnerability

If you believe you have discovered a security vulnerability in our platform, please report it immediately at security@calamaritrading.ai. We take all reports seriously, respond within 24 hours, and do not pursue legal action against good-faith security researchers.